I'm beginning to think child safety is getting way out of hand. I was driving home from resolving a customer issue (nothing major—just needed to reset a port on a switch—thank you ever so much, Monopolistic Phone Company), driving down the street towards Chez Boca when I saw a kid, maybe four or five years old, wandering about, on foot, close to home (easily within 50′ of the front door), wearing a bicycle helmet! There was no sign of any type of pedal-powered vehicle in the vicinity, although his mother was nearby, sitting on the front lawn watching out for the little kid.
He was wearing a bicycle helmet while walking!
Around his age, I was flying headfirst into ditches on my bicycle sans helmet and the only lasting affect is an inability to spell sertain words correctly. Well, that, and a tendency to say “that” instead of “who.”
He was wearing a bicycle helmet while walking, people!
Then again, I should be amazed he was let outside at all …
- Mark Grosberg <XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX>
- Sean Conner <firstname.lastname@example.org>
- Re: Password updated
- Tue, 5 Jan 2010 11:24:10 -0500 (EST)
On Tue, 5 Jan 2010, Sean Conner wrote:
What's the cookie2 header for?
I'm so glad you asked. This is almost so good it may cause you to blog about it (actually I figured by the time we were done discussing the insanity of cookies you may have had an insightful blog post anyhow).
I guess after the third cookie spec they figured they kinda sucked at this so they built in an escape. So after much re-re-re-reading of the RFC I think what happens is if you have received a cookie with a
$Versionthat you don't understand you are supposed to just send back a
It's for future expandability so when we have 10 cookies specs clients and servers will “just work” (at this point I think we both know that statement is about as truthful as “the check is in the mail.”).
Well Mark (and yes, I know, it's been a month), the cookie specs are a paragon of clarity compared to the laughable mess that is syslog protocol specification. Had I been aware of the “informational nature” of RFC-3164 I might not have even started my own homebrew syslogd replacement (network stuff in C, high level logic in Lua).
How loose is the spec?
A program that wishes to use
syslog() may select a
“facility” the message will be logged under—think of “facility” as a
subsystem, like “mail” or “cron” (under Unix,
scheduled tasks on a periodic nature) or “auth” (authorization, or login
credentials). Also, each message has a priority (kind of), one of
“debug”, “info”, “notice”, “warn”, “err”, “crit” (for critical
errors), “alert” (even more critical errors) and “emerg” (basically, the
machine is on fire, abandon all hope, etc.). The program using
syslog() can also tag each message, usually with its name, and
the message itself has no real structure, originally being meant for human
Now, the syslog protocol, which is used to send the messages to a program
that handles these messages, usually named
syslogd under Unix,
is a text based protocol, and a full RFC-3164 message would look something like:
<87>Feb 07 04:30:00 brevard crond: (root) CMD (run-parts /etc/cron.hourly)
You have the facility and priority (as a single number) in angle brackets, immediately followed by the timestamp, a space and then the name of the machine sending the message, a space and the tag (usually the name of the program on the machine sending the message), a colon, then the message.
And technically, every field is optional! Which makes parsing this a technical challenge. Not only that, but since there never really was a spec, it's easy to find ambiguous messages, such as:
<14>Jan 14 05:53:37 gconfd (spc-25469): Received signal 15, shutting down cleanly
which (per the spec) was sent from the program “(spc-25469)” on machine
“gconfd”. Funny thing is, I have no machine called “gconfd” but there
does exist a program called
gconfd that runs on my machine,
running as me, with a process ID of 25496 (fancy that).
I don't even want to talk about
It gets even worse. RFC-3164 makes a point in saying that the following is a legal syslog message that has to be processed:
Use the BFG!
Just writing the code to parse this mess took the majority of time, as I kept coming across syslog messages that really weren't.
To work my way out of this mess, if I don't find a proper facility/priority field, I log the raw message (using facility “user” and level “notice”, which is what RFC 3164 says to use in the absence of such information). If there's no timestamp, okay, but if there is one but it's malformed, I log the raw message. I then check for an IP or IPv6 address, as I feel that's really the only sane value to use, then everything else up to a ':' is accepted as the tag value (more or less).
Is it perfect?
But so far, it covers everything I've personally encountered. It will
misparse (which is a testcase I pulled from
rsyslogd), but not crash, on
<130> [ERROR] host.example.net 2008-09-23 11-40-22 PST iapp_socket_task.c 399: iappSocketTask: iappRecvPkt returned error
Garbage in, garbage out (also, stuff like this can be checked in the Lua code, as the raw message is available in addition to the parsed message).
Cookies? Insane? Not really. Not when compared to the syslog protocol.
So I've been learning more than I ever wanted to about the syslog protocol. There's the non-spec that is RFC-3164 that is optimistic in terms of the protocol. Then there's the cleaned-up spec that no one is using that is RFC-5424 (which is quite nice, if a bit over-engineered).
RFC-3164 documents the use of UDP as the transport protocol for the syslog protocol, reading that RFC one gets the impression that one should never actually use UDP as the transport mechanism, least some cracker intercept or change the messages, or worse yet—you lose some packets and get nailed in an Sarbanes—Oxley audit (or even worse still—an ISO-9000 audit—the horror! The horror!).
Well, you could try running the syslog protocol over TCP, but even that isn't good enough for some people, claiming that you can still lose logging information under certain circumstances. No, for reliability you need to add a layer of framing over TCP and wrap the syslog protocol in XML and call it a day.
I personally haven't seen an issue with using UDP for the syslog protocol. Not only do I relay syslog messages to a centralized server (my desktop box at Chez Boca, so I can watch the stuff in real time) but copies are kept locally (just in case). Also, there have been times when a TCP version (yes, even if I was using RFC 3195 or the lighter RELP) would have failed (at one point, our upstream provider upgraded a firewall that filtered out TCP traffic routed asymetrically and guess what? Our traffic was routed asymetrically; UDP traffic was unaffected and thus in that case, we were able to isolate the issue faster). Even the design of SNMP centered around UDP simply because it was “fire and forget” and thus on a congested network, there was a greater chance of UDP traffic of making it out and accepted than TCP traffic (which requires an acknowledgment that might never make it back).
But in looking over these, I'm struck that a reliable syslog protocol doesn't use SCTP, which has the reliability, ordering and (most importantly, congestion control) of TCP with the message-based semantics of UDP. Heck, for “reliability” SCTP has one feature that neither TCP nor UDP have: either peer can change the IP address used for the session.
For now, I'll just stick with UDP.