Wednesday, March 18, 2026
More notes on the Brazilian SYN attacks
One thing I forgot to mention yesterday was this observation from the Brazilian cybersecurity researcher who emailed me:
I've stood up a small sensor network, and so far I've captured data on two incidents. Both were observed from a sensor in São Paulo that responds on port 443 with a valid TLS certificate and a domain name. Two other sensors of mine were not hit: one in São Paulo that listens on 443 but has no domain name or valid certificate, and one in London with no server on 443 at all.
That's a tiny sample size and could be coincidence, but it lines up with comments I've seen suggesting that this actor only targets hosts that actually respond on 443. The TLS-certificate angle makes me wonder whether they're pulling target lists from Certificate Transparency logs.
Again, that makes sense given that all the SYN attacks have been directed towards the secure HTTP port. Checking certificate transparency logs is an easy way to find active servers that can be used for a SYN amplification attack.
But another weird thing I noticed—the Brazilian SYN attacks against my server have seemingly stopped.
I haven't seen one forged SYN packet for over 24 hours.
I don't think my reporting on it would effect that,
but perhaps after detecting that I'm blocking the packets they gave up on my server?
A potential botnet that was being used got taken down?
Very strange indeed … Nope. They're still happening. Sigh.
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